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EXTRA-STATECRAFT
Some of the most radical changes to the globalizing world are written, not in the 
language of international law and diplomacy but rather in the language of archi-
tecture and urbanism. Architecture and urbanism are often the literal instrument 
or vessel of a parallel form of polity—one generated faster than ofcial politi-
cal channels can legislate it. Architects frequently claim to be absent from the 
table and therefore innocent of the ofcial policies for crafting space. Yet as it is 
more and more clear that space is made not by ofcial agencies but by a growing 
number of nongovernmental agencies, lawless zones and discrepant characters, 
perhaps architects, as facilitators of power have long been seated at the table. 
Architecture is indeed a vessel of this extrastatecraft.
The domain of extrastatcraft is global infrastructure—not only those physi-
cal networks like highways, railroads or communication networks, but also 
those shared protocols of technology, urbanism and markets that format global 
exchanges and distributed networks of spatial products. The physical networks, 
both visible and invisible, made of concrete or microwaves, the silent consultan-
cies, the repeatable environments, the peculiar belief systems of management 
styles, the subroutines of logistics, or the establishment of regulating standards 
in the global: all of these are global infrastructures.
As historian and theorist Armand Mattelart has noted, many of the infrastruc-
ture histories constitute “a return to national histories while the international 
is still left by the wayside” as “a eld that is young and uncharted.”1 The study 
of global infrastructure operates somewhere between socio-technical studies, 
history of science and design. Moreover, global infrastructure is both topic and 
1  Armand Mattelart: Mapping World Communication: War, Progress, Culture (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994), p. 243.
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heuristic—a eld as well as a means of rehearsing a different habit of mind about 
disposition and active forms. Just as a pilot develops a faculty for seeing wind, 
looking at the organizational disposition of spatial products, infrastructures or 
socio-technical networks involves developing a similar faculty for making pal-
pable and available a spatial substrate that constitutes a realm of governance, 
authority or control in the world. We want to consider both objective forms and 
active forms, forms as outline, geometry as well as forms that operate in social, 
performative or relational registers. We want to understand the disposition imma-
nent in organization. 
Within this expanded artistic repertoire is an expanded repertoire for activ-
ism. The activist repertoire customarily relies on, among other things, resistance 
and refusal. Approaching the most powerful forces in the world with dissent 
frequently requires conviction and unity among those who have less power. It 
requires assembling together, refusing to be subject to abusive policies or protect-
ing others who are the target of abuse. The imperative for agreement on common 
rights and principles perhaps lends an aura of certainty to activism. Indeed, 
for many, the vigilant maintenance of decency and justice means strongly held 
beliefs, established principles and forthright expression. Resistance, even in its 
most complex, artful and viral forms must often assume a critical, oppositional 
stance—an organizational disposition that faces off against authoritarian power. 
Though they may have the power to strike at the heart of their opponent, explicit 
small-scale antagonisms on the periphery prevent collusion with the center. David 
must kill Goliath. These are those enduring techniques of activism that have, at 
certain junctures in history, required enormous courage to enact.
Yet, meanwhile power frequently escapes. Using proxies and obfuscation for 
protection, powerful players are rarely forthright about their intentions, in part 
because they survive on fluid intentions. The architecture of global relations is 
not, of course, arranged as a series of symmetrical face-offs or head-to-head bat-
tlegrounds. There is ample evidence of overlapping networks of influence and 
allegiance. Moreover, it may be a mistake to disregard caprice—the subterfuge, 
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hoax, and hyperbole that actually rules the world. The complex logics of duplic-
ity may be more instructive than the straightforward structure of righteousness. 
Indeed, the notion that there is a proper forthright realm of political negotiation 
usually acts as the perfect camouflage for parallel political activity. Finding the 
loophole to absolute logics or zero sum games, while power wanders away from 
the bulls eye or wriggles out to take shelter in another ruse. It may even come 
costumed as resistance. Goliath nds a way to pose as David, or multiple forces, 
assembling and shape-shifting, replacing the fantasy Goliath of monolithic capital 
or corporate culture with even more insidious moving targets.
Dissent is then left shaking its st at an efgy while power mimics or con-
founds with some other disguise. Activism that shows up at the barricade, the 
border crossing and the battleground with familiar political scripts sometimes 
nds that the real ght or the stealthier forms of violence are happening some-
where else. The opponent of dissent becomes an even more mystical or vaporous 
force (e.g. Capital, Empire or Neoliberalism). Even those theories that admit to 
complicities and mixtures somehow still drift toward epic heraldry and the theme 
music of enemies and innocents—monism and binary (e.g. Empire/Counter Em-
pire). In this way the grand strategies of the left and the right, as they are com-
bative, even share a structural resemblance. 
Righteous ultimatums that offer only collusion or refusal might present a 
greater obstacle than any of the quasi-mythical forces that activists oppose. Yet 
the admission of new techniques does not always align with the dogma or aura 
of certainty that attends some activist strains. Paradoxically, an attempt to aid 
and broaden activism can even be interpreted as a betrayal of activist principles. 
Stepping away from a combative stance is mistaken for neutrality. Manipulation 
of the market is mistaken for collusion. Positive attention to agents of systemic 
change rather than negative opposition to a series of enemies is mistaken for 
an uncritical stance. Relinquishing the tense grip of resistance is mistaken for 
capitulation rather than a more precise parry or a more apt strategy. Answering 
duplicity with duplicity is mistaken for equivocation or lack of conviction rather 
than a technique to avoid disclosing a deliberate strategy. There are moments to 
give it a name—to stand up and resist. Yet, preserving only some approaches to 
political leverage as authentic may foreclose on the very insurgency that activism 
wishes to instigate.
Activism in architecture and urbanism, even in the absence of a developed 
political repertoire, also drifts toward tragic stock narratives. Architects typically 
do what they always do: offer objective form in a nominative register that may be 
inflected toward or “themed” political. Designers design their reform, situating it 
9
4
 |
 E
as
te
rl
in
g 
| 
E
xt
ra
st
at
ec
ra
ft
at border crossings, battlegrounds and barricades. They may do so with varying 
degrees of utopian monism, visionary futurology or completely plausible savvy. 
It seems not to matter how apt, feasible or even sly the design may be in project-
ing implementation. It is often relegated to a margin because it resolves all the 
world’s dimensions into a single compatible utopia or because it makes too much 
sense. Alternately, architecture claims to be excluded or “not invited to the table” 
when policy is being made or refuses to perform for fear of being co-opted by the 
market—as if the market were interested or as if to manipulate the market was 
in any way similar to colluding with it. Encores of tragic arias about the impos-
sibility of a political architecture support an enduring innocence that is able with 
steady assurance to declare pure strains of political organization or able, for 
instance, to separate public from private, state from market. As Jacques Rancière 
has said, “To ask, How can one escape the market? is one of those questions 
whose principal virtue is one’s pleasure in declaring it insoluble.”2
The righteous and innocent should be allowed to remain pure and right. The 
dramas and tragedies of the Masonic order of architects give pleasure to many 
and need draw no further critique. While fully equipped with prodigious politi-
cal craft, that craft should only be deployed in the arena of careerism and should 
not be burdened with another political responsibility. Rather it should be allowed 
to remain undisturbed in the autonomous cul-de-sac that it has long requested. 
Dissent that would consider itself sullied by alternative tactics should also be al-
lowed simply to be right in its own way and to organize outrage against the most 
venal and grisly offenses against justice.
Yet while perhaps an unwelcome cohort for those who would see activism sul-
lied, some alternative activist techniques nevertheless stand to partner with classic 
forms of resistance. If many of the most powerful regimes nd it favorable to oper-
ate with proxies and doubles, so might two disparate species of activism generate 
2 Jacques Ranciere: “The Art of the Possible: Fulvia Carnevale and John Kelsey in Conversation 
with Jacques Ranciere”, Artforum International, 45:7 (March 2007).
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productive outcomes, if not in tandem in some other form of indirect cooperation. 
For extrastatecraft, an understanding of the logics of duplicity is more use-
ful than the binary oppositions of righteousness. Multiple realms of influence 
are kept in play to lubricate the obfuscation so important to the maintenance of 
power. Happily two can play at this game. The research collected here considers 
a dissensus that is less self-congratulatory and less automatically oppositional 
but potentially more effective (and sneakier). It sidesteps competitive binaries 
that often fuel the very violence we wish to dissipate. New objects of practice 
and entrepreneurialism, redened in a relational register, reflect the network’s 
ability to amplify structural shifts or smaller moves. If icons of piety, collusion or 
competition often escalate tensions, might alternative design ingenuities distract 
from them? In this realm of dissensus we can talk about an extended repertoire of 
trouble making and leverage that includes gifts compliance, misdirection, mean-
inglessness, humor, distraction, unreasonable innovation or spatial contagions, 
among many other techniques perhaps not typically associated with activism.
Extrastatecraft draws from research published in a book called Enduring 
Innocence that looked at “spatial products” as an infrastructure or a repetitive 
technology in the world. While regarded as the Teflon formats of neoliberalism, 
they frequently operate as political pawns in unexpected ways. The book also 
searched for additional tools with which to manipulate contemporary logics of 
duplicity as a disposition literally embedded in arrangement and chemistry of 
repeatable spatial organizations around the world. In the book there is a story 
about tourism in North Korea, high tech agriculture in southern Spain, automated 
ports, IT campuses in south Asia and the Middle East, Golf courses in China and 
the misadventures of commercial and religious franchises.
Spatial products are repeatable formulas for space, shaped by the para-
metric manipulation of, for instance, tonnage, lay-over times, housing frontage, 
bandwidth, tee time, stock keeping units or cheap labor. Enclosure is often a 
by-product of these organizations. The IT campuses that are outcroppings of 
satellite/ber networks in Malaysia or Dubai or Texas or Taiwan has the same 
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physical arrangement and they operate by the same rules. These formats are 
indexical expressions of legal and logistical parameters that create worlds of 
self-reflexive logic, a kind of special stupidity that moves around the world nding 
favorable conditions. 
These logistical environments are not only vessels of functional organizational 
parameters. They are also, ironically, the medium of obfuscation and puffy fairy 
tales of belief that accompany most relentless forms of power. Here are functional 
expressions that possess the capacity for crafty behavior and disposition. They 
are made by abstraction no less hyperbolic, volatile and extravagant. Indeed with 
nothing but a bottom line against which to reconcile history and belief, any com-
bination of masquerades is possible. Freighted with desires, sporting their global 
currency, and their duty free legalities, they can slither through any jurisdictional 
shallows. They can become objects of desire and contention in negotiations be-
tween warring countries, messy democracies and violent distended conflict. Their 
hilarious and dangerous masquerades of retail, business or trade often mix quite 
easily with the cunning of political platforms. We expect the world to be rational. 
Yet as these recipes become more rationalized, they become better vessels for 
ction. They are highly rationalized irrationalities.
It is useful to sample the nonsensical patois of the orgman, a character who 
would be something like, to borrow an example from Pierre Bourdieu, the man 
who sells to the father of the bride a yoke of oxen after the harvest. It is equally 
useful to sample the beautiful Babbitesque nonsense of the management guru and 
his think tanks, consultancies and motivational flip charts—for an understanding 
of the most deliberately rationalized systems that nevertheless resemble a kind of 
daft voodoo.
Global society is a rationalized world, but not exactly what one could 
call a rational one.3
3  Meyer, Drori and Hwang: Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organiza-
tional Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 269.
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Spatial products are good examples of active forms. Just as an airplane pilot 
must develop a faculty for seeing wind, the designer of active forms develops a 
faculty for seeing the way these byproducts inflate and deflate according to even 
the slightest adjustment of logic. While architects are very well rehearsed in de-
scribing enclosure and the aesthetics of the object, we are under-rehearsed in un-
derstanding organization in an active register, the deltas of spatial consequence 
in organization and the relational, dispositional registers of aesthetic practices. 
We might lack a better understanding of how our spaces manipulate other cul-
tural economic mechanisms. Often operating in a nominative rather than a rela-
tional aesthetic register, working with object form rather than both objective and 
active forms, we are often left designing the shape of the chess piece rather than 
the way the chess piece plays the world. Active forms design the means by which 
space disrupts or diverts, the politics of its aesthetic reception or the spread of 
its effects over a population. We frequently only design the object when we might 
design both the object and the delta.
Designing active forms develops a spatial fluency for describing the political 
disposition that is stored in the logic and arrangement of global infrastructure 
networks. The chemistry of this infrastructure is expressed in geometries, logics, 
economic mandates and networks of association. How do we further analyze this 
chemistry for patency, redundancy, hierarchy, recursivity or resilience as a vehicle 
of or recipe for aggression, submission, exclusion, collusion or duplicity? Extr-
astatecraft considers global infrastructures as a medium of these dispositional 
powers. 
We might look at three different arenas of global infrastructure as a way of 
sampling some evidence: the free zone, submarine beroptic cable networks, and 
networks of quality management. Each of these arenas drop into a nexus of multi-
ple networks and economies.
The Free Zone
Free zone urbanism is currently the world’s most powerful urban paradigm and 
a vivid vessel of extrastatecraft. Zones are heir to ancient pirate enclaves or the 
freeports of Hanseats (or Easterlings), In 1934, emulating freeport laws in Ham-
burg and elsewhere of the late 19th century, the United States established Foreign 
Trade Zone status for port and warehousing areas related to trade. As the zone 
merged with manufacturing, Export Processing Zones appeared in the late 1950s 
and 60s. Emerging in the 1970s, China’s Special Economic Zones allowed for an 
even broader range of market activity and foreign direct investment. But even the 
zone as it is typically regarded around the world is breeding more promiscuously 
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with other “parks” or enclave formats, perhaps in part because of China’s influ-
ence. There are at least 66 terms to describe the zone. The zone now merges with 
tourist compounds, knowledge villages, IT campuses, and cultural institutions 
that complement the corporate headquarters or offshore facility. More and more 
programs and spatial products thrive in legal lacunae and political quarantine, 
enjoying the insulation and lubrication of tax exemptions, foreign ownership 
of property, streamlined customs and deregulation of labor or environmental 
regulations
Indeed, the zone as corporate enclave is a primary aggregate unit of many 
new forms of the contemporary global city, offering a “clean slate,” “one-stop” 
entry into the economy of a foreign country. Most banish the negotiations that 
are usually associated with the contingencies of urbanism—negotiations such 
as those concerning labor, human rights or environment. Many of the new legal 
hybrids of zone oscillate between visibility and invisibility, identity and anonymity. 
The data gathered by the Organization or Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the International Labor Organization (ILO) demonstrates that 
special zones of various types have grown exponentially, from a few hundred in 
the 1980s to between three thousand and 4000 today operating in 130 countries in 
2006. 
With its pervasive growth and breeding, the zone often aspires to world city 
status. Moreover, while the zone is a space generally exempt from law and taxes 
as well as environmental or labor regulations, it is even, paradoxically, a new dou-
ble of the national capital. These urban vessels somehow naturalize the essential 
duplicity involved with juggling multiple sovereignties and interests. Now major 
cities and national capitals are engineering their own world city Doppelgängers 
—their own non-national territory within which to legitimize non-state transac-
tions. The corporate city and national capital can shadow each other, alternately 
exhibiting a regional cultural ethos and a global ambition. City-states like Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Dubai that assume the ethos of free zone for their entire 
territory have become world city models for newly minted cities like with not only 
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commercial areas but a full complement of programs. New Songdo City for in-
stance, aspiring to the cosmopolitan urbanity of New York, Venice and Sydney, is a 
zone double of Seoul lled with residential, cultural and educational programs in 
addition to commercial programs. There is a Park Avenue, Canal Street, Central 
Park and World Trade Tower. Just as New Songdo City is a free zone double of 
Seoul, Astana, replacing Almaty, has become the unabashed free zone capital of 
Kazakhstan. The state has hired the world’s architects and engineers to give the 
city an anticipated technical and experiential infrastructure as well as a fantasy 
utopia.
Agamben’s notions of exception will only go so far to explain these sneakier, 
commercial zones, forms that, with perfect duplicity, swap and pair exemptions, 
playing the legalities of one country off of another. The zone aspires to lawless-
ness, but in the legal tradition of exception, they possess a mongrel form that 
adopts looser and more cunning behaviors than those associated with an emer-
gency of state. Commercial interests do not identify a single situation within 
which exception is appropriate. They move between zones concocting cocktails of 
legal advantage and amnesty. 
Fiberoptic Submarine Cable
In the last hundred years, the ocean floor has received more and more strands 
of submarine cable of all types; and yet East Africa—one of the most populous 
areas of the world—remains in a broadband shadow as one of last places on 
earth to receive an international ber-optic submarine cable link. During the 
summer of 2009, the rst of these links nally arrived. Still, broadband in Kenya, 
for instance, costs twenty to forty times what it does in the United States. Before 
the most recent cable landings, connectivity for a small BPO (Business Proc-
ess Outsourcing) ofce with twentyve calling stations cost $17,000 per month, 
while similar ofces in countries such as India, Malaysia, Mauritius, the UAE, 
and China could provide the same capacity for $600−1000. East Africa has been 
considered the world’s “missing link” in telecommunications, and as the cable 
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links arrive, the world will be watching to see how the new infrastructures avoid 
the problems that other African countries have encountered with monopolies and 
continued exorbitant prices.
The main mobile telephone companies in Kenya whose advertisements line the 
highway (e.g. Safaricom, Celtel, Zain, Orange Mobile, Telkom Kenya and Econet) 
project images of villagers talking on cell phones. These companies compete with 
parastate telcoms that have gradually been privatized since the 1990s at the urg-
ing of the IMF and World Bank. Along the same road, a billboard publishes the 
forty percent unemployment rate. This well-educated English-speaking popula-
tion needs broadband to create viable business connections and to vie for a piece 
of the global outsourcing market. When the Africa One cable, designed to circle 
the entire continent of Africa failed, existing cable systems were extended to 
landings on the west coast of Africa. They stopped in South Africa, and, because 
of monopolies and corruption, failed to ease prices for broadband in the west. In 
January of 2003, a group at the East African Business summit gathered to con-
sider an independent cable project called East African Submarine Cable System 
or EASSY. This time, the World Bank and Nepad, (New Partnership for Economic 
Development) based in Sout Africa were going to insist that it be an open system 
to avoid the problems associated with monopolies. Yet administrative delays in 
executing the EASSY cable were creating the same effect as the monopolies that 
NEPAD (new partnership for economic development) and others were trying to 
guard against. Dr. Bitange Ndemo, The Permanent Secretary in The Ministry for 
Information and Communications in Kenya, positioned his country to remain 
a supporter of EASSY while pursuing other options. An alternative cable plan, 
TEAMS, funded by the Kenyan government together with private telcoms in 
Kenya and the UAE, was planned to link Mombasa to international cables from 
the UAE. Another independent, privately funded cable plan, SEACOM, was devel-
oped to take a similar course to that of the delayed EASSY cable. The situation 
has been characterized as a cable war, but war is probably the least appropriate 
characterization of the multiple players, bargains, and points of leverage in the 
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complex game of bandwidth access in East Africa. The bandwidth will likely serve 
new employment centers that assume the form of free zones with premium infra-
structure. In Kenya however, the zone is frequently not a place that forbids labor 
unions, but rather a center of labor union organization.
Even in a digital age, the heavy industries that provide physical infrastruc-
ture, working together with extrastate organizations like IMF, World Bank and 
countless NGOs create a sphere of governance and influence operating in infra-
structural space.
ISO
Extrastatecraft also investigates meta-organizations, the organizations of organi-
zations that contribute to this sphere of governance. 
While on hold, a voice says “Your call will be monitored for quality assurance 
purposes.” Credit cards and bank cards, all .76mm thin, slide through slots and 
readers anywhere around the world. The threads on screws manufactured for 
a global market conform to a given pitch. The pictograms on the dashboard are 
roughly the same world-wide. Batteries are sized to t any device and their dura-
tion is consistent. Rates of broadband information transfer are synchronized. File 
formats contain data links that communication with different software platforms. 
Management regimes share a vocabulary of jargon like “best practice” or “action 
plan” dictating conformance to explicit business practice. 
These standards are the work of one especially vivid agent in the promulga-
tion of standards and shared managerial forms—the International Organization 
for Standardization, or ISO. The ISO is a leader among a number of other stand-
ard developing and managerial organizations operating in regional, national and 
international contexts. 
A number of such organizations, existing before the ISO, were players in its 
evolution and continue as partners today. For instance, the International Telecom-
munications Union, established in 1865, was one of the rst truly international 
agencies. It is now a United Nation Agency, headquartered in Geneva, Switzer-
land. It originally coordinated telegraph communication and then organized the 
use of the radio spectrum and has continued to encourage improvements and 
standards in telecom, ICT industries and communication systems of all sorts in-
cluding that related to marine and air safety. The Electrotechnial Congress (IEC) 
was established in 1906 to generated standards in electronic device. It was the 
rst international standard organization. In 1865, The foundational conference of 
the International Telegraph Union is one early marker in the growth of interna-
tional organizations—growth that in recent decades has been ballooning.
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On May 17, 1865 the Convention of the International Telegraph Union was 
signed. This was the rst international agreement concerning most of 
Europe since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.4
Headquartered in Geneva, the Vatican of international organizations, ISO pre-
sides over technical standards like those for roller bearings, refrigerants, lubri-
cants, tourism or footwear, but it also generates the incantations of something 
called quality. Quality management anticipates the satisfaction of customers 
through attitude-shifting and team aspirations, and ISO hopes that in addition to 
technical standards, that management standards hold the greatest hope of uni-
versality. “Quality” used in the world of business and industrial management does 
mean what it means in common parlance. Rather than referring to a character-
istic or a valued attributed it refers to procedures related to controlling and im-
proving both material production and management practices. Quality has its own 
history, its own organizations, institutions publication and its own culture ethos 
that is now also incorporated within the ISO framework. Quality standards do not 
dictate specic standards for a product but rather offer management guidelines 
for process of attaining goals related to a product, goals design to ensure that 
products meet expectations. The value of those products is not assessed. Quality 
management standards outline a process for achieving internal goals related to 
the product. So the product and expectations related to it are intended to be the 
result of a “learning” organization,” but the primary result may be a rather iso-
morphic set of the business procedures. 
Quality standards join what John Meyer has called an “organization as reli-
gion phenomenon.”5 The European Union has encouraged adoption of ISO 9000 
guidelines and in 1992 required ISO compliance and certication as a condition 
4  Anton A. Huurdeman: The World-side History of Telecommuncations (John Wiley & Sons, 
2003), p. 219.
5  Meyer, Drori and Hwang: Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organiza-
tionalChange (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 273
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within its trade policies. ISO has also developed management standards related 
to environment, the ISO 14000 series. Signicantly, ISO 14000 standards do not 
control emissions but establish a lot of internal steps, inclinations, and altered 
habits about the environment. Quality standards anoint the user with a seal of 
approval that presides over a number of soft immaterial changes in attitude and 
style. ISO has also extended quality management standards to education, health 
care and, in a conflation of customers and citizen, to government.
Standards and standardization make it possible to achieve co-ordina-
tion without a legal center of authority. Such tendencies could be seen in 
the EU, with its increasing use of product standards and ‘soft law’ as a 
means to further integration.6
Extrastatecraft
Study of extrastatecraft is attracted to spatial entrepreneurialism, unreason-
able innovation, and obdurate problems that continually resist intelligence. 
Architects might swim in these dirty waters with all the other shills, butlers and 
go-betweens, looking for new points of leverage within the ctions and persua-
sions that we already have running through our ngers. Some backstage knowl-
edge of the bagatelle in exchange, the players in the game and the cards being 
dealt returns more information about the tools and techniques of extrastatecraft. 
Expelling utopian prescriptions in favor of agility, ricochet and cultural contagion, 
extrastatecraft tutors a different species of spatiopolitical activism in the back 
channels of global infrastructure.
6  Peter Mendel: “The Making and Expansion of International Management Standards: The 
Global Diffusion of IS) 9000 Quality Management Certicates.” In: Meyer, Drori and Hwang: Glo-
balization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 137 – 166.
